Too Damned Quiet? by Kent, Adrian
ar
X
iv
:1
10
4.
06
24
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.po
p-
ph
]  
4 A
pr
 20
11
Too Damned Quiet?
Adrian Kent
Perimeter Institute, 31 Caroline Street N,
Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 2Y5, Canada.∗
(Dated: February 2005; minor revision April 2005)
Abstract
It is often suggested that extraterrestial life sufficiently advanced to be capable of interstellar
travel or communication must be rare, since otherwise we would have seen evidence of it by now.
This in turn is sometimes taken as indirect evidence for the improbability of life evolving at all in
our universe.
A couple of other possibilities seem worth considering. One is that life capable of evidencing
itself on interstellar scales has evolved in many places but that evolutionary selection, acting on
a cosmic scale, tends to extinguish species which conspicuously advertise themselves and their
habitats. The other is that – whatever the true situation – intelligent species might reasonably
worry about the possible dangers of self-advertisement and hence incline towards discretion.
These possibilities are discussed here, and some counter-arguments and complicating factors are
also considered.
∗Permanent address: Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Cam-
bridge, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge CB3 0WA, United Kingdom.
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I. COMMENTS: APRIL 2011
This article was written in early 2005, and submitted then to Science. Perhaps predictably
enough, it was rejected. Since then it has languished in my filespace, while I occasionally
wondered whether to try to make it more publishable in a peer-reviewed science journal
(and indeed whether that was possible).
Having recently noticed 2003 and 2005 arxiv papers by Beatriz Gato-Rivera expressing
some very similar ideas [1, 2], I decided now to bite the bullet and distribute it as is.
Sometimes, one should have the courage to communicate hypotheses even when they are
difficult or impossible to test any time soon or argue rigorously for. (As Prof Gato-Rivera
did: credit to her.) Gato-Rivera focusses on the possibility that all advanced civilisations
would deliberately and consciously choose to remain inconspicuous, which she calls the
Undetectability Conjecture. While the ideas in this paper obviously can fit with this premise,
it seems to me that the case for undetectability (such as it is) is made a little stronger by
considering the evolutionary mechanism for selecting inconspicuity discussed below, and its
possible applicability regardless of the conscious exercise of intelligent choice.
To arxiv readers who feel that speculating about possible explanations for the lack of
visible alien life goes beyond the boundaries of current science, I would say (a) you clearly
have an arguable point, and part of me salutes your scientific rigour and notes that reading
the article isn’t obligatory, yet (b) on the other hand, the borderline between the scientific
and extra-scientific isn’t necessarily forever sharply fixed on this topic – after all, the ideas
are ultimately testable in principle by searching the cosmos and seeing what is out there,
and even now one could make some sort of test of the arguments’ (im)plausibility, however
inconclusive, with suitable models, and also (c) sometimes it is intellectually legitimate for
scientists to engage in reasoning about subjects that go beyond the current boundaries of
experimental or observational science: we just need to be clear that’s what we’re doing when
we do that (and clear too about the limitations of our arguments).
In any case, whatever scientific status it merits, the article gives arguments for a point
of view and hypotheses that I still think deserve more attention. So here it is.
Apart from the addition of the references to Gato-Rivera’s work, and a disclaimer added
to the acknowledgements, the article below is unchanged from its April 2005 version.
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II. INTRODUCTION
Fermi’s famous question — “where is everybody?” — frames, in the plaintive cry of
neglected hosts through the ages, a real intellectual puzzle. It is, on the face of it, sur-
prising that aliens appear to display such little interest in the Earth and its inhabitants.
Are the scientific, artistic and technological glories of our planet’s civilisations not worthy
of at least cursory attention? Is there really no exobiotic need — aesthetic, intellectual,
comedic, psychotherapeutic, gastronomic — that we terrestrials could satisfy? And even if
extraterrestrial life isn’t interested in visiting us, why do we see no evidence of it elsewhere?
It is difficult to discuss this topic intelligently, given that we know almost nothing about
the existence of bio-friendly environments other than Earth, the existence or otherwise of
extraterrestrial life, the forms it might take, or the ways in which it might behave. Most
of our ideas about extraterrestrials — whether set out in science fiction or (I would guess)
in the policy documents of space exploration agencies — are just figments of our psyches.
[3] We do, though, have one source of conjectures that may at least plausibly be useful:
extrapolation from the Earth’s evolutionary history.
III. EVOLUTION ON A COSMIC SCALE?
The aim here is to consider how life might evolve, or choose to behave, when it is or
could be conspicuous on a cosmic scale. Here “conspicuous” means “conspicuous to some
independent lifeform on a reasonable fraction of other cosmic habitats”. The discussion
doesn’t require assuming that life originally evolved or currently exists only on planets,
but I shall make the assumption anyway for succinctness, using “planet” as shorthand for
“cosmic habitat”, and taking “independent lifeform” as shorthand for “lifeform having an
evolutionary history which begins on a different planet”.
One can consider the possible ways in which extraterrestrial life might generally interact
or avoid interaction without making any assumption about where we fit into the picture.
If the aim of the discussion is to give a possible explanation for why we haven’t seen any
evidence of extraterrestrial life, though, we need to assume that we are, by virtue of our
senses and acquired science and technology, reasonably competent cosmic observers, so that
if cosmically conspicuous life was prevalent, we would expect to see a fair fraction of it.
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Obviously, if we are just not equipped to look for the right things, then our incompetence is
sufficient to explain why we don’t see extraterrestrial life. Even if that were very likely true,
though – say, if our planet were surrounded by a dense nebula, allowing us to observe the
universe only by a very restricted frequency band — it would still be interesting and useful to
consider how more favourably situated and more competent extraterrestrials might interact.
Knowing the answer might not, in this case, help explain why we don’t see extraterrestrial
life, but it might be a useful guide to our future actions (should we attempt to communicate
or travel outside the nebula?).
Note that in principle one could imagine one lifeform being conspicuous to another one,
living on a different planet, without assuming that either is intelligent or technologically
advanced.
Now, it could be that cosmically conspicuous life, or life capable of interstellar travel, or
even just life, has evolved nowhere but on Earth. It could also be that, although cosmically
conspicuous life has evolved independently at many locations in the cosmos, its evolution
is relatively rare, and it generally survives for relatively short periods, so that creatures
originating in different cosmic habitats should expect rarely, if ever, to encounter evidence
of one another. This has often been suggested, on the grounds that lifeforms are unlikely
to become cosmically conspicuous until they develop radio technology, and that our own
example suggests that once intelligent lifeforms reach this level they are likely very soon
to acquire massively destructive weapons and (it is argued) will proceed quickly to bring
about their own extinction. Another possibility, often considered in science fiction, is that
the cosmos is teeming with intelligent species, who roam far and wide, but are careful to
ensure that we are unable to infer their existence, perhaps because they have decided not
to interfere with our development.
Though each of these scenarios may perhaps be plausible, I do not want to discuss them
further here.
The point of this paper is to introduce and consider some other explanations. Consider,
for instance, the following hypotheses. First, life has evolved relatively frequently in the
cosmos. Second, interactions between species originating on different planets have not been
so uncommon. Third, these interactions have often led to species becoming extinct (or at
least to previously conspicuous species becoming inconspicuous, either because their numbers
and/or technological development have been greatly reduced, or because their behaviour has
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been permanently altered). Fourth, as a consequence, evolutionary selection, operating on
galactic or even larger scales, has ensured that typical surviving species are not conspicuous
to typical observers who are based in another cosmic habitat and capable of interstellar
travel.
Perhaps the most obvious version of these hypotheses involves “wars of the worlds” —
deliberately waged struggles between rival intelligent and technologically advanced civilisa-
tions. One could, indeed, restrict discussion only to this case, assuming that only intelligent
species are able to travel from one planet to another. It is worth noting in passing, though,
that the hypotheses do not necessarily require such struggles to be the dominant selec-
tion mechanism. One could, for instance, imagine (though I am not sure whether it is
really plausible) predatory species which have somehow evolved to propagate over inter-
stellar distances, perhaps somehow guided by being somehow attuned to signs of distant
life or promising-looking habitats, although they have nothing that we would recognise as
advanced intelligence.
Similarly, it is important to note that cosmic inconspicuity need not necessarily arise as
the result of a deliberate decision by an advanced civilisation. Some intelligent species might
indeed prudently make themselves as inconspicuous, and their habitat as desolate-looking
and useless, as possible, either because they are concerned about the possibility of interstellar
predation, or perhaps even because they have observed it in operation from afar. But others
might perhaps simply lack the wit, gumption, or interest to advertise their coming of age or
to venture beyond their native environment — and have rather greater chances of survival
because of their lack of initiative. (No one said that life is fair.) And some species might
avoid predation through the good fortune of happening to take such an unfamiliar form
that most other inhabitants of the cosmos would not recognise them as living, or by using
such exotic resources that their habitats are not generally seen as valuable, and so surviving
unnoticed.
IV. WHY CONSPICUITY?
Suppose now that there is indeed some sort of competition for resources on a cosmic
scale and that some sort of evolutionary selection ensues. Is it at all plausible that conspicu-
ity should be an important criterion in this selection process? After all, on Earth, though
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many species do indeed successfully employ camouflage and concealment, it is not generally
true that the most successful species live in habitats completely hidden from other competi-
tor species. Terrrestrial ecosystems are generally characterised by complex symbioses and
interactions amongst their component species.
One might imagine that, if any cosmic scale ecosystems actually exist, they would be
similarly complex. But there are some reasons to think that the situation might be very
different. If cosmic habitats can indeed largely be equated with habitable planets, they are
discrete and (on our current best guesses) very widely separated, unlike most terrestrial
habitats. And if inhabitated planets are very widely separated, there may well be no easy
way for an inhabitant of planet A to identify inhabited planet B, unless the inhabitants
of B succeed in some way or other (perhaps inadvertently) in advertising their existence.
One imagines that an inhabited planet, together with the ecosystem it supports, constitutes
a resource that would be valuable to (some significant subset of the) species originating
on other planets. For instance, a sufficiently technologically advanced species might find
it worthwhile to use (the exobiotic analogue of) genetic engineering to adapt the planet’s
entire ecosystem to their purposes. Of course, these purposes may not be entirely compatible
with the purposes of its original inhabitants. In fact, the stakes may be still larger, and the
competition correspondingly fiercer, than this suggests, if the inhabitants of planets A and
B are also potential or actual competitors for resources elsewhere (whether other inhabited
planets or some other type of resource).
In summary, there is a potential competition for resources, and a potential evolutionary
mechanism for selecting against those who tend to lose such competitions. If cosmic habitats
are widely enough separated that they are very hard to find, by far the best strategy for a
typical species to avoid defeat in such competitions may be to avoid entering them, by being
inconspicuous enough that no potential adversary identifies its habitat as valuable.
V. COMPLICATIONS
But not so fast. A little reflection suggests that, even if conspicuity is indeed liable to
provoke some sort of predation from competitors, the selection dynamic must be rather more
complicated than the preceding discussion allows. In the first place, it is difficult to predate
on a conspicuous habitat without making oneself conspicuous. Even granted an exemplarily
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stealthy attack and takeover, the mere fact that the previously conspicuous species B is
no longer so gives a clue to observers elsewhere that some other species A, with its own
potentially interesting resources, may now be in occupation — and hence that it may also
perhaps be worth exploring the neighbourhood for other habitats that species A occupies.
If species A manages to take over while leaving in place whatever made the habitat
conspicuous in the first place, they might manage to make their conquest imperceptible.
But then, of course, the habitat would remain conspicuous: this would not contribute to an
evolutionary selection against conspicuous habitats, and so would not support our attempt
to explain the lack of conspicuous extraterrestrials.
A really cautious predator might perhaps try to take over species B’s habitat while giving
the impression that species B had self-destructed. This might or might not be believed:
however good the cover story, it would presumably lose credibility if a number of independent
species on different habitats in a given region appeared to self-destruct within a statistically
implausibly short time interval.
If B’s takeover is detected or inferred by species C, they might be tempted to jump in.
But so might species D, E, and so on. Considering this possibility might thus deter not only
species C, but also species B. (Or evolution might have selected against this behaviour.)
But then, if species B, C and so on are all deterred, species A is after all left alone, happily
broadcasting its existence to the cosmos.
Our original scenario appears to be in danger of self-contradiction. But the inconsistency
arises only if one contemplates an absolute law stating that any form of self-advertisement
is certain to provoke attack from competitors which leads to extinction. A more reasonable
picture is of a cosmos with species which behave with varying degrees of caginess: some
predate on any conspicuous habitat, some attempt to observe predators before perhaps
predating on them, some look for evidence of second (or third, or higher) level predation
and observe for a long time before deciding whether to become involved, and some just sit
tight and remain as inconspicuous as possible, hoping to avoid predation. In such a world,
all species are playing a game with very imperfect information. It would be very difficult to
produce a model that convincingly predicts the likelihoods and spatial distributions of the
various strategies, since the answer surely depends on many unknowns (for example: what
is the distribution in time and space of the evolution of cosmically conspicous species? what
is the distribution of their capacities to predate and defend? and what is the distribution
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of the strategies they are initially predisposed to adopt?). The correct formulation of the
hypothesis is simply that evolution has very significantly suppressed cosmic conspicuity.
Obviously, this hypothesis may simply be wrong. It is not, I must admit, evident that,
even if life did indeed originate on many different widely separated planets, the suppression of
cosmic conspicuity would be the likeliest outcome of an evolutionary competition, assuming
one did indeed ensue. But the hypothesis is certainly not logically inconsistent and it seems
to me not entirely implausible, especially in comparison to other proposed solutions to the
Fermi problem.
A further complication, which incidentally lends at least slight support to the plausibility
of the hypothesis, is that species may be induced to predate on conspicuous near neighbours
even if their general strategy is to remain inconspicuous and avoid predation. Noisy neigh-
bours are liable to attract unwelcome attention to the neighbourhood. One could perhaps
run as far away as possible, but this requires finding another unoccupied and inconspicuous
habitat. Not only may this be hard, and thus dangerous in itself, but there is the added
danger that one risks becoming conspicuous to predators during the search. Eliminating
noisy neighbours is, at least arguably, less dangerous than leaving them alone: they might
not yet have been noticed by some potentially dangerous predators, and one might presume
that they are only going to become more conspicuous, and hence more dangerous to have
around, unless one intervenes. And even if they have already been noticed, eliminating them
does not necessarily add to the danger: the overall risk of more powerful predators arriving
in the neighbourhood, and noticing you, may not be increased.
VI. DELIBERATE INCONSPICUITY
Intelligent species do not have to follow their instincts blindly. Reflecting on these pos-
sibilities, and awareness of the uncertainties involved, might deter many intelligent species
from interstellar exploration, and persuade them to remain as inconspicuous as possible on
their home planet. A typical rational species should conclude that, if life in the cosmos is
common, the chances are that there are species elsewhere that are more highly developed
and likelier to prevail in any struggle that might develop. If the cosmos is, in fact, a compet-
itive and dangerous place, a typical species thus ought, rationally, to be pessimistic about
its own chance at prevailing, if it enters into the cosmic fray.
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The relevant probabilities are unknowable, but even if they are pretty small, the cost
(likely extinction) is so high that the possible gain of new habitats and new knowledge may
not seem adequate compensation, unless perhaps one’s situation is already truly desperate.
A thoughtful species might, at the very least, decide to wait and observe for a long while,
in the hope of getting some evidence about the state of life elsewhere, before taking steps
that would advertise its own existence.
VII. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
Where does this all leave us? What could the situation be in, say, our own galaxy?
Maybe, of course, we are the only species in the galaxy (resident or visitor) capable of space
travel, and nothing we do in the foreseeable future is going to affect our conspicuity to any
potentially dangerous species. But the possibilities considered here also suggest less stable
scenarios. We ought at least to consider them seriously and be convinced that they really
are negligible before neglecting them.
One could imagine, for instance, a mixed population of cautious predators and cautious
stay-at-homes. Assuming there is currently no dominant predator, any predators which
attempted dominance in the past must have come to grief. (Perhaps this seems unlikely: if it
was defeated by another predator, why would that predator not have come to dominate? And
is it really plausible that a very powerful but reticent stay-at-home could, when threatened,
have taken out a predator with galactic ambitions?) Advertising our existence in such an
environment would be risky: a predator species might decide it could afford to predate on us,
and even a reticent neighbour species might decide it could not afford to leave us attracting
the attention of predators to the neighbourhood.
One could also imagine a situation in which one predator species dominates (perhaps co-
existing with successfully inconspicuous stay-at-homes) but remains as stealthy as possible.
A rational predator species might well do just that, adopting a predatory strategy which as
far as possible eliminates unnecessary risk. Advertising our existence in this environment
would most likely be suicidal.
A third possibility is that most or all species are cautious stay-at-homes, fearful of interac-
tion. It is unclear what result advertising one’s existence would have in such an environment,
but one should probably not expect a welcoming response.
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VIII. SOME COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
A. Aliens are civilised
One common counter-argument arises from scepticism that species will wish to carry on
competing by the time they have become sufficiently advanced to attempt interstellar travel.
Would the wisdom of co-operation not be clear, and would respect for exobiotic cultures not
be a universally accepted value, by that point in a species’ evolution? Could any advanced
species really destroy the unique and irreplaceable culture of another, in the process gravely
altering an ecosystem that was millions or billions of years in the making? Morality aside,
would enlightened self-interest not militate against such vandalistic aggression?
These are nice and optimistic presumptions, and one would like to believe they are right,
but the evidence of the last few millennia on Earth does rather give pause for thought.
Perhaps there really are cosmic civilisations worthy of the name. But everything alive in the
cosmos has, presumably, evolved to compete for resources in environments where they are
not always plentiful, to reproduce successfully, and to give its offspring the best chances in
life. Almost every aspect of the psychological makeup of aliens may be utterly unrecognisable
to us: indeed the term itself may not apply in any recognisable sense. But the best guess
we can make, extrapolating from life on Earth, is that any species which controls significant
resources is likely to have maintained a powerful urge to live and to multiply.
Perhaps, nonetheless, enlightened self-interest prevails. Perhaps co-operation is, and
is almost universally recognised as, a better survival strategy than predation; perhaps a
combination of consensus and enforcement has brought about some sort of modus vivendi.
If there is intelligent life out there then we had better hope so, and hope also that other
civilisations are tolerant of our naivete´. It doesn’t seem a good advertisement for our value
as recruits to cosmic society that we have not yet even seriously contemplated the alternative
scenarios.
B. Self-advertisement signals peaceful intention
It is sometimes suggested, when our own attempts to contact extraterrestrials are dis-
cussed, that the sort of trusting openness we have displayed to date is the best policy. Since
we must realise that aliens are likely to be more advanced than us, we anyway could not
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hope to prevail in competition with them. By displaying our trust, we show that our own
intentions are peaceful and our desire is to learn and collaborate, and hence that they have
nothing to fear from us either now or at any point in the future, and that we deserve their
help and respect. Should we be persuaded by this argument? More to the point, might
another species who receives our signals be?
I rather doubt it, unless extraterrestrial civilisations share our capacity for spasmodic
outbreaks of truly epic self-delusion. In the first place, as our own history sadly illustrates
very well, aggressors may not care much whether a weaker group (or species) has peaceful
intentions or not: they tend rather to latch on to the point that their relative strength allows
them to capture and exploit its resources regardless. Secondly, our superficially trusting
openness does not actually credibly signal that our intentions are necessarily peaceful. The
most cursory inspection of present day Earth would show the discerning alien that our
intentions are, at best, mixed and fickle. If we happened to come upon a weaker species
inhabiting a resource-rich planet similar to Earth somewhere in our vicinity, our leaders
would no doubt make the right noises about our peaceful and noble intentions, and a sizeable
number of us would sincerely agree — but history suggests it would be rash to bet against
our colonising and exploiting the planet in the long run.
Our openness to date in advertising ourselves to hypothetical extraterrestrials seems to
me to demonstrate only our lack of thought and self-knowledge, not to mention a decidedly
tactless lack of consideration for our cosmic neighbours who, if they exist, may not share
our insouciance about attracting possible predators to the region.
C. Interstellar conquest isn’t worth it
Another common counter-argument is that it hardly matters whether aliens are malevo-
lent or benevolent, since any species which is technologically advanced enough to constitute
a threat to us will also surely — since technology develops quickly, and the chances of two
independent species being at similar levels of development is very small — be so advanced
that it has no use for the pitiful resources we and our fellow terrestrials have to offer. bossi-
bly — but again, terrestrial history gives one pause for thought. Great empires do take
an interest even in rather small and unprepossessing territories. They can do so, often,
precisely because they are techologically advanced: conquest thus requires few personnel
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and small resources, relative to their capacity. It may indeed not be worthwhile for the
hyper-advanced Sirians to send a large fraction of their interstellar battle fleet to conquer
Earth and rearrange its ecosystem into a productive Sirian-friendly habitat. But might the
rewards not justify the effort for three bored undergraduate Sirians armed with borrowed
lab equipment and looking for a mildly remunerative holiday project?
IX. CONCLUSION
The Fermi problem is a real puzzle, and it seems to me that none of the proposed solutions
(including the one suggested here) is so compelling as to inspire confidence that it is clearly
right. Yet there must be a solution, of course. The relevant question, thus, it seems to
me, when considering any proposed solution is not whether it is completely convincing, but
whether there is another solution which is clearly more compelling. In other words, does
the proposed solution belong on the list of contenders? If it does, then we had better take
it seriously as a possibility when considering policy.
We do not seem, as a species, to be particularly good at thinking realistically either about
small risks of large disasters or about our situation in the cosmos. These are seen as not
quite respectable topics in the academic world. Almost no one is employed to worry about
them, and the prevailing mood of postmodern irony makes it hard for us to take them quite
seriously. But they deserve to be taken seriously nonetheless.
We have, famously, taken a few steps actively to advertise our existence: the 1974 Arecibo
message [4] beamed towards the Hercules globular cluster, the golden records [5] and plaques
[6] carried aboard the Voyager and Pioneer spacecraft, carrying information about us and
star maps directing any interested aliens to our solar system, and, more recently, the Team
Encounter “Cosmic Call” messages [7] sent to a number of nearby (30−75 light years away)
stars.
What was the point of these efforts? Were they well justified? Distinguished scientists
and others have argued on several occasions that, on the contrary, they were dangerously,
and potentially suicidally, irresponsible [8]. These arguments appear to have largely fallen
on deaf ears, but they deserve repeating, and perhaps can even be amplified a little in the
light of the above discussion.
One can summarise the essential point simply enough. If there are no aliens out there,
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any efforts at communication were obviously wasted. Thus we can assume for the sake of
discussion that there are aliens out there likely to receive the messages at some point. The
relevant parameter, then, is not the probability of our messages being received by aliens who
might potentially do us harm: it is the conditional probability of the aliens who receive the
messages doing us harm, given that the messages are indeed received (and understood to be
messages). Can we really say that this probability is so negligible, bearing in mind that any
such aliens appear to have made no reciprocal attempts to advertise their existence? The
arguments considered above suggest that we cannot.
The Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft are travelling sufficiently slowly that they will pose
essentially no additional risk for a very long while. We could, though, take steps to enforce
a ban on any further attempts along the lines of the Arecibo and Team Encounter messages.
We might also want to take steps to intercept and return the Pioneer and Voyager craft
some time in the next few millennia. These might, at this point, only be gestures. But if
we believe in the merits of gestures at all, they seem more worthwhile than most. They
would, at least, be small signals that we have begun contemplating the possible realities of
our cosmic existence, and might just possibly be coming to realise that it would be wise to
tread carefully and politic to take care not to jeopardise the interests of our neighbours. If
anyone happens already to be listening, that really would be a message worth sending.
One final point: it often seems to be implicitly assumed, and sometimes is explicitly
argued, that colonising or otherwise exploiting the resources of other planets and other
solar systems will solve our problems when the Earth’s resources can no longer sustain our
consumption. It might perhaps be worth contemplating more seriously the possibility that
there may be limits to the territory we can safely colonise and to the resources we can safely
exploit, and to consider whether and how it might be possible to evolve towards a way of
living that can be sustained (almost) indefinitely on the resources of (say) our solar system
alone.
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